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Abstract
In this paper, we present a general multiparty model-
ing paradigm with Privacy Preserving Principal Component
Analysis (PPPCA) for horizontally partitioned data. PPPCA
can accomplish multi-party cooperative execution of PCA un-
der the premise of keeping plaintext data locally. We also pro-
pose implementations using two techniques, i.e., homomor-
phic encryption and secret sharing. The output of PPPCA can
be sent directly to data consumer to build any machine learn-
ing models. We conduct experiments on three UCI bench-
mark datasets and a real-world fraud detection dataset. Re-
sults show that the accuracy of the model built upon PPPCA
is the same as the model with PCA that is built based on cen-
tralized plaintext data.
Introduction
Although big data concepts and technologies have become
popular, a single organization is likely to have limited data,
which makes it difficult to meet the requirements of machine
learning models. Meanwhile, different organizations are of-
ten unwilling or unable to share data because of the compe-
tition or privacy regulations. Isolated data islands situation
has become a serious problem weakening the performance
of artificial intelligence in the real world.
Existing researches adopt cryptographic techniques,
e.g., homomorphic encryption (Hardy et al. 2017)
or secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
(Mohassel and Zhang 2017), to solve these problems.
However, they have two weaknesses. First, their running
time is much longer than the models built on aggregated data
due to high computation complexity and communication
complexity of the cryptographic techniques. It gets even
worse in practice because of the large scale data. Second,
they are usually model-specific, i.e., the models need to
be built case by case. However, in real-world applications
such as fraud detection and risk control, machine learning
models usually need to be rebuilt periodically. If a general
modeling or preprocessing method can be designed, the
deployment of privacy preserving machine learning models
can be greatly accelerated and the development costs can be
significantly reduced.
∗Guiquan Liu is the corresponding author.
Copyright c© 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
Furthermore, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is
popularly used to transform the original data from one space
to another (Pearson 1901). Under isolated data island situ-
ation, how to perform PCA becomes a hot research prob-
lem. For example, Al-Rubaie et al (Al-Rubaie et al. 2017)
proposed to use additive homomorphic encryption and gar-
bled circuits for PCA with a single data user. With the in-
crease in feature dimension, the computing time increases
rapidly. Grammenos et al (Grammenos et al. 2019) adap-
tively estimated the rank of PCA with unknown distribution
in a streaming setting. Liu et al (Liu et al. 2018) proposed
a huge digital data outsourcing scheme. However, none of
them focus on building privacy preserving PCA for multi-
party modeling.
For these reasons, we propose a general modeling
paradigm with PPPCA for horizontally partitioned data,
which belongs to the category of shared machine learning
(Chen et al. 2018; Chen et al. 2020b). It involves two meth-
ods using homomorphic encryption and secret sharing re-
spectively. Results of PCA can protect data privacy to a cer-
tain extent, and can be further improved by using differential
privacy (Wei et al. 2016). Under the honest-but-curious set-
ting, the results of PPPCA can be sent directly to any data
consumer to build any machine learning models. Our contri-
butions are two-folds:
• We propose a privacy preserving modeling framework us-
ing PPPCA, where the plaintext data are hold by partic-
ipants locally. The result of PPPCA can be carried out
for building any machine learning models, which signif-
icantly improves the generality and efficiency compared
with the models built using time-consuming cryptograph-
ical techniques case by case.
• We propose two PPPCA approaches using secret shar-
ing and homomorphic encryption respectively. Experi-
ments on three UCI benchmark datasets and a real-world
fraud detection dataset demonstrate that our approaches
are lossless comparing with the approach that aggregates
plaintext data.
Preliminaries
In this section, we present problem statement and some pre-
liminary concepts of our proposal, including secret sharing
and homomorphic encryption.
Problem Statement
Data Setting. Data provided by different participants are
partitioned horizontally in the data space. That is, datasets
share the same feature space but different sample space.
Input. The plaintext data that are provided by M (M >
1,M ∈ Z+) participants. We use Xi (1 ≤ i ≤ M ) to
denote the corresponding plaintext data of i-th participant,
where each column represents an attribute, and each raw
represents a sample. In horizontally partitioned situation, the
joint data can be formalized asX = (XT
1
X
T
2
··· X
T
M )
T
. We
use di and ni to denote the feature dimension and the sam-
ple dimension of participant i, and use d and n to denote the
feature dimension and sample dimension of the joint data,
where n =
∑M
i=1 ni, d = d1 = · · · = dM .
Output. The dimension reduced matrix X ′i from each par-
ticipant whose dimension is ni×k (k < d). It can be carried
out for building any machine learning models.
Constraint. The lossless & privacy preserving ability. The
performance of PPPCA must be comparable to the non-
private solution that brings all data in one place, while pro-
tecting the data privacy.
Additive Homomorphic Encryption
Additive homomorphic encryption, e.g., paillier
(Paillier 1999), is a method that supports secure addi-
tion of numbers given only the encryptions of them. The
ciphertext operation on untrusted participant is secure.
The result of the operation needs to be sent to the private
key holder for decryption to get the plaintext result. We
denote the ciphertext of a number u as JuK and overload
‘+’ as a homomorphic addition operation on ciphertext
space. Additive homomorphic encryption satisfy that for
any plaintext u and v,
JuK + JvK = Ju+ vK. (1)
However, plaintext in this arithmetic must be the element
of finite field. In order to support floating point operations,
we adopt the encoding scheme (Hardy et al. 2017). This ap-
proach is based on a floating-point representation, and ulti-
mately encode a number as a pair consisting of an encrypted
significant and an unencrypted exponent. Moreover, these
operations can be extended to work with vectors and matri-
ces component-wise.
Secret Sharing
Secret sharing is a technique of secure Multi-Party Compu-
tation (MPC), which is widely used to build machine learn-
ing models (Mohassel and Zhang 2017; Chen et al. 2020a).
In our case, all data providers participate in the calcula-
tion together, and the final result is reconstructed from their
calculation results. Therefore, we choose n-out-of-n secret
sharing (Singh et al. 2017), which is an efficient scheme.
In this paper, we mainly focus on additive secret shar-
ing. To additively share l-bit secret value s owned by party
M , party M first generates M shares {r1, · · · , rM}, where
ri ∈ Z2l (1 ≤ i ≤ M − 1) are random numbers generated
using Pseudo-Random Generator (PRG) and the last share
rM = s−
∑M−1
i=1 ri mod 2
l. Then partyM distributes these
shares toM data providers (including itself). All intermedi-
ate values are secret-shared between data providers. We de-
note the share owned by party i as 〈s〉i. Given secret values
{s1, · · · , sM} from M data providers, to calculate the sum
of them, each data provider needs to calculate the sum of
their local shares (e.g., party i calculates intermediate values
〈vi〉 =
∑M
j=1 〈sj〉i mod 2
l). Finally, the result is the sum of
these local results. During this process, all participants are
invisible to others’ inputs.
The above secret sharing schema works in finite field, and
can be extended to real number field following the encode
and denote scheme in (Hardy et al. 2017). It is trivial to gen-
eralize the single number operations to matrices.
The Proposed Method
In this section, we propose PPPCA framework and its two
implementations.
Overview
PPPCA aims to perform private PCA for multiple data
providers under server-aided setting. It refers to three roles:
data provider, server, and data consumer. Data provider
owns the data and participates in the calculation. Server does
not have any input, participates in some computation but
does not receive any privacy output. It can be untrusted but
cannot collude with data providers. Data consumer use the
result of PPPCA for further modeling. It takes three steps to
execute PPPCA under horizontally partitioned case:
• Firstly, all data providers jointly normalize the columns
(attributes) to zero with secure operation. For example,
each value of attribute t owned by different data providers
should be divided by the mean of them, which is denoted
as xt =
∑
M
i=1 sit
n
=
∑M
i=1
∑
j∈Ii
xjt
∑
M
i=1
ni
, where sit is the sum
of observations of feature t owned by data provider i and
can be computed locally. xt can be computed by all par-
ticipants using secure additive operation.
• Secondly, all data providers jointly compute the the co-
variance matrix C:
C =
1
n− 1
X
T
X
=
1
n− 1
(
X
T
1 X
T
2 · · · X
T
M
)


X1
X2
...
XM


=
1
n− 1
(XT1 X1 +X
T
2 X2 + · · ·+X
T
MXM ),
(2)
whereX2
i
= XT
i
Xi can be computed locally. Hence,C
can be computed by all data providers and server collabo-
ratively using secure additive operation. At the end of this
step, the plaintext of C is owned by server.
• Thirdly, server calculates the eigenvalues and correspond-
ing eigenvectors of C locally, chooses k (k < d) eigen-
vectors to form the matrix T according to the size of the
Algorithm 1: HE based PPPCA framework
Input : Data {X1, · · · ,XM} ; dimension after PCA
(k)
Output: Dimension reduced matrixX′
1 Server generates a key pair and sends public key to all
data providers;
2 Data providers compute and encrypt the mean of their
features locally as JSiK and send it to party p;
3 Party p receives {JS1K, · · · , JSMK}, computes
JxK =
∑M
i=1JSiK, and sends it to server;
4 Server receives JxK, decrypts it, and sends it to all data
providers;
5 Data providers receive x and normalize columns to zero
locally;
6 Data providers compute and encrypt
JCiK = J
1
n−1
X
T
i
XiK locally and send it to party p;
7 Party p receives {JC1K, · · · , JCMK} , computes
JCK =
∑M
i=1JCiK, and sends it to server;
8 Server decrypts JCK, computes transfer matrix T , then
sends it to all data providers;
9 Data providers receive matrix T , calculateX′
i
= XiT
locally, then send it to data consumer;
10 Data consumer receives dimension reduced matrix
X
′ = (X′1
T
, · · · ,X′
M
T )
T
for modeling;
11 return Dimension reduced matrix X′;
eigenvalues, and broadcasts it to data providers. Each data
provider calculates X′
i
= XiT locally and sends it to
data consumer for further modeling.
Step 1 and step 2 will use secure operation, which can be
boiled down to secure matrix addition operations. We will
present how to implement these two steps with homomor-
phic encryption and secret sharing.
Additive Homomorphic Encryption Based Method
Secure additive operation is done by Homomorphic Encryp-
tion (HE). The server is responsible for generating a key
pair, sharing public key with all participants, and holding
the private key for decryption. For secure matrix additions
in step 1 and 2, all data providers firstly encrypt matrices
that need to be added (e.g.,X2
i
) and send them to one of the
data provider (denoted as p, 1 ≤ p ≤ M − 1). Party p re-
ceives these encrypted matrices and does the homomorphic
additive operation in ciphertext space. Finally, party p sends
the result to server for decryption. We present the whole HE
based PPPCA framework in Algorithm 1.
Secret Sharing Based Method
In this method, secure additive operation is done by secret
sharing. In the last step of secret sharing, all of the data
providers will send their local calculation results on shares
to server. Then server computes the sum of these shares to
reconstruct the plaintext result. We present the whole Secret
Sharing (SS) based PPPCA framework in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: SS based PPPCA framework
Input : Data {X1, · · · ,XM} ; dimension after PCA
(k); plaintext space Z2l
Output: Dimension reduced matrixX′
1 Data providers compute features’ mean Si locally,
generateM shares {〈Si〉1, · · · , 〈Si〉M}, and distribute
them;
2 Data providers receive {〈S1〉i, · · · , 〈SM〉i} from each
other, compute 〈Vi〉 =
∑M
j=1 〈Sj〉i mod 2
l, and send
it to server ;
3 Sever receives {〈V1〉, · · · , 〈VM〉}, computes
x =
∑M
i=1 〈Vi〉 mod 2
l, and sends it to all data
providers;
4 Data providers receive x and normalize data columns to
zero locally;
5 Data providers computeCi =
1
n−1
X
T
i
Xi, generateM
shares {〈Ci〉1, · · · , 〈Ci〉M}, and distribute them;
6 Data providers receive {〈C1〉i, · · · , 〈CM〉i} from each
other, compute 〈V′i〉 =
∑M
j=1 〈Cj〉i mod 2
l locally,
and send it to sever;
7 Server receives {〈V′1〉, · · · , 〈V
′
M〉} and computes
global covariance matrixC =
∑M
i=1 〈V
′
i〉 mod 2
l;
8 Server computes eigenvectors, chooses k of them to
form the matrix T , and sends it to data providers;
9 Data providers receive matrix T , calculateX′
i
= XiT
locally, and send it to data consumer;
10 Data consumer receives dimension reduced matrix
X
′ = (X′1
T
, · · · ,X′
M
T
)
T
for modeling;
11 return dimension reduced matrix X′;
Security Discussion
Our protocols are secure against honest-but-curious adver-
saries. That is, data providers, server, and data consumerwill
strictly follow the protocol, but they will keep all intermedi-
ate computation results and try to infer as much information
as possible. We also assume that the server does not collude
with any data providers.
In PPPCA, data providers only receive the mean of each
feature which does not contain the details of each feature.
As for data provider p in HE based method, all it receives
from others are encrypted matrices. The server only has the
covariance matrix which does not contain private informa-
tion neither. The data consumer gets the result of PPPCA,
which can not infer private raw data. Therefore, the security
of our proposed PPPCA framework is satisfied.
Experimental Studies
In this section, we focus on answering the following research
questions. Q1: is the accuracy of the model built upon PP-
PCA the same as the model with PCA? Q2: what is the
difference of efficiency between homomorphic encryption
based method and secret sharing based method?
Table 1: AUC and RMSE results of logistic regression and
linear regression on different datasets
Dataset
PCA
(Centralized)
PCA
(Separately)
PPPCA
Secure Op - - HE SS
Fraud 0.9663 0.8978 0.9692 0.9613
APS 0.9915 0.9863 0.9918 0.9906
Wine 0.7122 0.7498 0.7103 0.7126
Online 8.0484 8.0801 8.0517 8.0493
Experimental Setup
We conduct experiments on 4 datasets, including one real-
world fraud detection dataset (Fraud) (Group April 25 2018)
and 3 public datasets from UCI, i.e., APS Failure dataset
(APS) (Tony Lindgren September 2016), Wine-quality
dataset (Wine) (Cortez et al. 1998), and Online News Popu-
larity dataset (Online) (Kelwin Fernandes January 8 2015).
The first 2 datasets are for classification problems and the
others are for regression tasks. The fraud detection dataset
has 298 features and 792,004 transactions. We focus on
horizontally partitioned case, therefore we assume these
data are hold by different parties and each of them has
roughly equal partial samples.
We use five-fold cross validation during experiments. Af-
ter PPPCA, we adopt the most popular three kinds of mod-
els, i.e., linear model, tree based ensemble model, and deep
model for classification and regression problem. Note that
it can be generalized to any other machine learning models.
We adopt Area Under the receiver operating characteristic
Curve (AUC) as the evaluation metric for binary classifica-
tion tasks and Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) for regres-
sion tasks.
Comparison Results
Answer to Q1: accuracy.We assume there are two parties
and conduct the following comparison to answer Q1.
First, we compare the model performance built on (1)
PCA using centralized plaintext data, (2) PCA using decen-
tralized plaintext data, and (3) PPPCA using Homomorphic
Encryption (HE) and Secret Sharing (SS). We choose logis-
tic regressionmodel for fraud and APS, since they are binary
classification tasks, and choose linear regression model for
Wine and Online dataset, since they are regression tasks. We
report the comparison results in Table 1. From it, we can
see that the model built upon PPPCA is lossless comparing
with the model build on centralized plaintext PCA, andmod-
els build on local PCA separately have worse performance.
This experiment indicates the effectiveness of PPPCA.
Second, we compare the performance of different models,
i.e., Logistic Regression (LR), Gradient Boosting Decision
Tree (GBDT), and Deep Neural Networks (DNN) on APS
dataset. We summarize the results in Table 2, where we find
similar results as in Table 1. This experiment indicates the
PPPCA can be used to build any privacy preserving machine
learning models for multi-parites.
Answer to Q2: efficiency.We now study the time efficiency
of our two proposed methods. To do this, we vary the num-
Table 2: AUC results of different models on APS dataset
Model
PCA
(Centralized)
PCA
(Separately)
PPPCA
Secure Op - - HE SS
LR 0.9915 0.9863 0.9918 0.9906
GBDT 0.9941 0.9857 0.9943 0.9948
DNN 0.9937 0.9913 0.9928 0.9931
Table 3: Running time (in seconds) of PPPCA with different
number of parties
Method
Runing time Num of parties
2 3 4
HE based method 3.16 3.23 3.36
SS based method 2.91 3.22 3.42
ber of parties and compare the running time of PPPCA on
Wine dataset. We report the results (in seconds) in Table 3.
We can see that with the increase of data providers, the run-
ning time of HE based method grows slower than SS based
method. This is because the time of HE is mainly spent on
encryption, which can be done by each party in parallel. In
contrast, as the number of parties increases, the running time
of SS based method increases dramatically.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a general modeling paradigm
with Privacy Preserving Principal Component Analysis (PP-
PCA) for horizontally partitioned data under server-aided
setting. It involves two methods using homomorphic encryp-
tion and secret sharing respectively. Experiments on three
UCI datasets and a real-world dataset demonstrated the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of PPPCA. In the future, we would
like to deploy PPPCA in real-world applications in Ant Fi-
nancial.
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